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Resumen
Desarrollamos un modelo que muestra que fallas en la protección de los derechos de los
acreedores incrementan las restricciones financieras que enfrentan los deudores más
pequeños. Debido a la existencia de costos fijos de monitoreo, en equilibrio los bancos no
monitorean a las firmas pequeñas y estas adoptan tecnologías más riesgosas con mayor
probabilidad de bancarrota. Esto implica que las ineficiencias en el proceso de bancarrota
afectan más a las firmas pequeñas que a las grandes. Utilizando una encuesta de firmas en 62
países del mundo y técnicas econométricas que permiten lidiar con componentes observables
y no observables específicos a cada país, así como con problemas de endogeneidad,
exploramos empíricamente el impacto de la protección de los acreedores sobre el
financiamiento a la pequeña y mediana empresa. Encontramos que mejoras en la protección
de los acreedores reducen la brecha de financiamiento entre empresas grandes y pequeñas.
Abstract
We develop a model that shows that inefficient legal protections, disproportiantely increase
financial restrictions for creditors that have less wealth. Due to fixed monitoring costs in
equilibrium banks will not monitor small firms and therefore these firms will adopt risky
technologies that imply a higher probability of bankruptcy. This implies that inefficiencies in
the bankruptcy procedure will have a greater effect on small firms vis a vis large ones. Using
a survey of firms in 62 countries around the world (WBES) and econometric techniques that
allow us to deal with observed and unobserved country specific components as well as with
partial endogeneity, we explore the role of creditor protection on small and medium-size
enterprises’ access to bank credit. We find that better protection of creditors reduces the
financing gap between small and large firms.
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Recent corporate ﬁnance literature has emphasized the role played by ﬁnancial
development and legal protections to outside creditors in the performance of
ﬁrms . One of the crucial implications of this literature is that underdeveloped
ﬁnancial and legal systems may constrain ﬁrms in their ability to ﬁnance invest-
ment1. Bank credit in particular plays a very important role for ﬁrms, especially
in developing countries where equity markets are considerably underdeveloped.
When access to bank loans is restricted, potentially proﬁtable projects cannot
be undertaken and economic activity can stagnate. If credit is constrained, so
is investment, and since technology is often embedded in new capital goods,
the capacity of economies to absorb new methods of production and to grow is
adversely aﬀected.
This paper explores how diﬀerent legal and institutional setups can have an
asymmetric impact on the access to credit of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The main
idea of this study is that weak enforcement of credit contracts or ineﬃcient
bankruptcy procedures take a higher toll on small ﬁrms than large ones due to
monitoring costs faced by lenders. We formalized this, using a model based on
the standard idea that it is not easy for lenders to enforce both a particular use of
the credit granted and the level of entrepreneurial eﬀort. The model introduces
these two type of moral hazard, combining the formulation in Hölmstrom and
Tirole (1997, 1998) and Bester and Hellwig (1987), standard references in the
corporate ﬁnance literature.
Three important conclusions emerge from our model. First, large ﬁrms tend
to be more leveraged than small ﬁrms; second, large ﬁrms tend to be less volatile
than small ﬁrms due to their technology adoption; and third, improvements in
contract enforcement or the eﬃciency of bankruptcy procedures increase access
to credit of small ﬁrms relative to large ones.
The ﬁrst two implications of our model have been veriﬁed elsewhere. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) shows that in all G7 countries but Germany small ﬁrms have
lower leverage level than large ones. Using broader data, similar those used in the
empirical section of this study, several authors have shown that across the world
the ﬁrst of the implications above holds, that is, small ﬁrms are less leveraged
than large ones 2. Table 1 summarizes data, whose source is discussed below,
which show that in the World as a whole, as well as for developing countries
exclusively, the share of investment ﬁnanced with bank credit is larger in large
ﬁrms. In our sample an average small ﬁrm ﬁnances around 11% of its investment
with credit, while medium and large ﬁrms ﬁnance 17% and 26% respectively3.
The second implication, that large ﬁrms are less volatile, has also been am-
ply documented. Table 2 presents summary data from a set of papers that
1See La Porta et al (1997, 1998) for detailed discussions.
2See for example Clarke et al. (2001), Beck et al. (2002), Beck et al. (2003) and Love and
Mylenko (2003).
3In section 3 we describe how the data is constructed. At this stage it is convenient to
point out that small ﬁrms are deﬁned as those more than 5 but with fewer than 50 employees.
Medium sized ﬁrms are those with more than 50 but fewer than 500, and large ﬁrms are those
with more than 500 workers.
1have explored this issue in detail for the case of employment volatility. The
table shows that job turnover, a measure of employment volatility, is signiﬁ-
cantly higher in small ﬁrms as opposed to large ﬁrms both in Latin American
developing countries and the United States.4
The purpose of the empirical part of this paper is to explore in detail the
third implication of our model, namely that improvements in the quality of
bankruptcy procedures as well as in the enforcement of credit contracts reduces
the gap in credit access between small and large ﬁrms. For this purpose we
use the World Bank ’s World Business Environment Survey, a ﬁrm level survey
carried out in 1999 and 2000 among ﬁrms across the world to assess competitive-
ness, and we perform a series of econometric exercises to validate the theoretical
model. Figure 1 compares the share of investment ﬁnanced with credit in ﬁrms
of diﬀerent sizes in Common Law countries vis a vis non common law countries.
La Porta et al (1998) show that Common Law countries have better creditor
protection and enforcibility. In line with this, Figure 1 shows that, for each
size category, ﬁrms in Common Law countries are more leveraged. Second, and
more interesting, the gap in access to credit between large and small ﬁrms is
larger in non Common Law countries. This result is in line with the third pre-
diction of our paper. In section 4 we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence econometric
approach to analyze the impact of diﬀerent degrees of creditor protection on
the ﬁnancing gap of small creditors relative to large ones. The methodology
controls for country-speciﬁce ﬀects and allows us to deal with a possible omit-
ted variable problem common to many cross country studies. By doing so, our
empirical study allows us to identify causal links between the institutional data
and access to credit.
Most of previous theoretical research does not focus on the distinction be-
tween SMEs and large ﬁrms. Moreover, a simple extention of these model to
account for small and large ﬁrms fails to explain why large ﬁrms are leveraged,
less risky and why the credit access gap between large and small ﬁr m si sd e -
creasing with better creditor protection. For example, most standard models
imply that small ﬁrms should be equally or more leveraged than large ones, and
in equilibrium all ﬁrms adopt the same type of technology. 5 As we already
mentioned, combining two standard models in corporate ﬁnance, our theoretical
setup replicates, in a simple way, all the three stilized facts described above for
SMEs.
Our paper is an addition to the vast literature on the role of institutions in
economic development. Numerous empirical papers have shown the strength of
the links between access to ﬁnance and growth. For example, Rajan and Zin-
gales (1998) show that ﬁnancial development positively aﬀects the growth rate
4Turnover is deﬁned as the sum of the absolute value of plant’s employment changes divided
by the average total employment in years t-1 and t. See Davis, et al (1996) and IPES (2003).
5The extension of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) of Townsend (1979)’s costly state veriﬁca-
tion model, the Aghion et al (1999) model, as well as the eﬀort moral hazard a la Holtrom
and Tirole (1997,1998) imply that the amount of credit is linear on ﬁrm ’s wealth. If on top,
we assume decreasing returns to scale to investment we have that small ﬁrms should be more
leveraged than large ones. In addition, in all these model, in equilibrium all ﬁrms adopt the
same type of technology (either a risky or a safe one).
2of industries relying heavily on external ﬁnancing. At the ﬁrm level Demirgüc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), using a data set of large ﬁrms around the world
show the importance of the ﬁnancial system and the rule of law in relaxing
external ﬁnancing constraints and facilitating growth. Similarly, Love (2003)
shows that in countries with deeper ﬁnancial markets large ﬁrms are less credit
constrained, and the dependency of investment on cash ﬂow is reduced. Us-
ing sector-level data, Braun and Larraín (2004), show that better accounting
standards ease ﬁnancial constraints over the business cycle.
In general, the literature on credit restrictions in ﬁrm development stresses
the role of asymmetric information in credit rationing6. The consequences of
information and incentive problems for investment have been explored in many
papers7. Regarding the size of ﬁrms, the empirical literature on ﬁnancial con-
straints, for example has pointed out that small ﬁrms tend to be more credit
constrained than large ones 8. The apparent fact, though, is that under similar
institutional setups smaller ﬁrms tend to face deeper constraints than larger
ones. Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004), for example, ﬁnd that the
eﬀect of institutions on ﬁrms’ growth can be asymmetric depending on the size
of ﬁrms. In fact, they ﬁnd that ﬁnancial and legal development signiﬁcantly af-
fect the growth of ﬁrms, especially in small and medium-sized ﬁrms. Our paper
complements this work by providing a rigorous analysis of the channels through
which such a relationship can work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theo-
retical model, Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical study, Section
4 presents our econometric strategy and some basic results, Section 5 reports
some robustness exercises performed, and Section 6 concludes.
6Most papers base their idea on Stiglitz and Weiss(1981), or on models with costly state
veriﬁcation, as in Williamson (1987). In general, even if informational asymmetries and
contract enforcement problems do not lead to credit rationing, they make external funds
imperfect substitutes for internal funds and invalidate the separation between ﬁnancing and
investment choices implied by the Modigliani-Miller Theorem.
7Bernanke and Gertler (1989 and 1990), Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Calomiris and
Hubbard (1990), Gertler (1992), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996 and 1999), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988 and 1993) are examples of this litera-
ture.Although the models diﬀer in their details, two main results emerge from this literature.
First, external ﬁnance is more costly than internal ﬁnance unless loans are fully collateralized.
Second, the premium on external ﬁnance is an inverse function of a borrower’s net worth
(liquid assets plus the collateral value of illiquid assets). Any negative shock to net worth
(due to technological reasons, shift in investors’ preferences, or changes in monetary policy)
leads to an increase in the premium and, therefore, to a reduction in investment and produc-
tion. For this reason the initial impact of the shock may be ampliﬁed (the so-called “ﬁnancial
accelerator” eﬀect).
8See Schiantarelli (1996) or Hubbard (1998) for a review of several criteria that have been
used in the literature to divide ﬁrms into groups according to the likelihood of being ﬁnancially
constrained. The main cross-sectional criteria used to identify ﬁrms for whom information
and agency problems are more or less severe are aﬃliation with industrial groups and banks,
foreign ownership, and size.
32 Creditor Protection and Access to Credit: A
Model
In this section, we describe a model that serves the purpose of deriving testable
hypotheses for the empirical part of the paper. The model is based on the
standard idea that it is diﬃcult for a lender to enforce both a particular use for
the credit granted and the level of entrepreneurial eﬀort. The model introduces
these two types of moral hazard, combining the formulations in Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997, 1998) and Bester and Hellwig (1987). Broadly speaking, we
assume that there are two kinds of risk-neutral agents. Borrowers face proﬁtable
investment opportunities but do not have enough cash for ﬁnancing their own
projects. Banks, on the other hand, have plenty of cash, but no investment
opportunities.
The main intuition of the model is that banks have a monitoring technology
that forces entrepreneurs to adopt a safe technology that reduces the "assets
substitution moral hazard" and increases leverage. The monitoring action has
a ﬁxed cost per entrepreneur and therefore is only worth using when the entre-
preneur has a high level of wealth (required to reduce the eﬀort moral hazard),
which implies a high level of investment. The solution of the model shows that
in equilibrium banks will not monitor small borrowers (hereafter we will refer
to the entrepreneurs with low initial wealth as SMEs). This increases the moral
hazard problem for small ﬁrms and will induce them to adopt a risky technol-
ogy with a higher probability of bankruptcy. We show that improvements in
the eﬃciency of bankruptcy procedures have a larger positive eﬀect on SMEs
than large ﬁrms.
In the model we assume that the borrower faces an investment opportunity
at date to that returns Rj p e ru n i to fi n v e s t m e n ta td a t et1 in case of success and
L in case of failure (residual value per unit of investment). However, the project
is subject to two types of moral hazard. On one hand, the borrower may choose
between two technologies with diﬀerent level of risk but similar expected payoﬀ
(=Ω). The risky technology has a payoﬀ (Rr) larger than the safe technology
(Rs) in case of success, but its probability of success is lower (πs >π r).9 On
the other hand, regardless of the technology adopted, the probability of success
depends on the entrepreneur’s eﬀort. When the entrepreneur does not behave
i nt e r m so ft h el e v e lo fe ﬀort, the probability of success is reduced by ∆πe.D u e
to this lack of eﬀort the entrepreneur obtains a private beneﬁto fB>0 per
unit of investment, regardless of the outcome of the project and the technology
adopted. For both technologies, we assume that the net present value of the
project is negative in case the entrepreneur shirks (low eﬀort and therefore lower
probability of success).10
Now we turn to describing the kind of contracts that can be written and
enforced. Let I denote total investment and suppose that a bank is willing to
9Both technologies have the same expected return: Rs∗πs+(1−πs)L = Rr∗πr+(1−πr)L =
Ω.
10These are standard assumptions in this literature.
4lend C = I−W to the borrower, where W denotes the amount of wealth that the
entrepreneur puts in the project. In case of success, the lender pays the borrower
RB per unit of investment; in case of failure, she pays him nothing. However,
when the project fails, an outcome that we interpret here as bankruptcy, the
residual investment I ∗ L is liquidated. Due to problems in the bankruptcy
procedure the residual value of this investment is only αIL. In this setup α is
a measure of creditor protection.
Banks, beside ﬁxing the level of credit and lending interest rate (implicit in
Rb), have the ability to monitor the project, in which case they may force the
entrepreneur to adopt the safe technology. This monitoring action has a ﬁxed
cost ψ per entrepreneur. Banks have a zero cost of funding and the banking
industry is competitive (banks break even in equilibrium). To focus on the
interesting case in which entrepreneurs go bankrupt in case the project fails,
we impose parameter conditions in which in equilibrium banks always charge a
positive lending interest rate.11
Finally, we assume there are two types of entrepreneurs with two diﬀerent
levels of wealth, those whose wealth is greater than W,and those with less
wealth.
In the next section we solve the model. First we solve conditional that one
type of technology is adopted, and then we endogenize the technology adoption
as well as the bank’s decision whether to monitor or not.
2.1 Solution Conditional to the Technology Adoption.
Conditional to the adoption of a technology the entrepreneur maximizes the
following problem.
Max π(R − RB)I − W
st
IC : ∆πeI(R − RB) >IB
BP : πIRb +( 1− π)αIL ≥ I − W
Where IC is the incentive compatibility constraint and BP is the bank’s
participation constraint. Banks are competitive, therefore in equilibrium they
break even (that is the bank’s participation constraint is binding). In addition,
as proﬁts are linear in I, in equilibrium the entrepreneur IC is bidding, therefore:
11Formally, we assume that the percentage reduction in expected proﬁts due to bankruptcy
costs are smaller than the percentage increase in leverage due to the fact the banks, in good






The numerator in the right hand side is the expected lost (per unit of investment) due
to bankruptcy costs. The denominator is the net present value - NPV of the project. The
ﬁrst term in the left hand side is the "equity multiplier" in the case where banks lend without
bankruptcy risk, and the numerator, loosely speaking, is the increase in the "equity multiplier"
due to the fact that the bank will receive a higher payment in case of success than of failure
(positive loan interest rate).
5I = W
1
1 − π(R − B
∆πe) − (1 − π)αL
= WE Q M (π,B,α) (1)
This condition implies that investment is proportional to the level of the
entrepreneur’s wealth. The second term in the expression is known in the cor-
porate ﬁnance literature as the “equity multiplier” (EQM). This multiplier is
increasing with our measure of creditor protection (α) and decreasing with the
severity of the moral hazard problem (B). From the previous equation we can
derive the equilibrium amount of credit and leverage level:
C = I − W = W
π(R − B
∆πe)+( 1− π)αL
1 − π(R − B





∆πe)+( 1− π)αL (2)
Given that the project’s net present value of shirking is lower than the one
with eﬀort (even considering the private beneﬁt), the second equation implies
that the leverage level will be lower under the adoption of the risky technology
(lower π).12 Equation (2) also shows that a greater severity of the moral hazard
problem (larger B)t h el o w e rw i l lﬁrm leverage be in equilibrium. The opposite
occurs with the degree of creditor protection, higher creditor protection (α),
leads to more credit. The detrimental eﬀect of lack of creditor protection is in-
creasing with the probability of failure. Bad institutions hurt during bankrupcy
procedures.
Replacing the solution in the entrepreneur’s proﬁt function we have:
Π(W)=( πR +( 1− π)αL − 1)
1
1 − π(R − B
∆πe) − (1 − π)αL
W = Φ(π)W (3)
The proﬁt function is an increasing linear function of wealth. The ﬁrst term
in equation (3) is the proﬁtp e ru n i to fi n v e s t m e n t( u n i t - p r o ﬁt), and the second
term is the already deﬁned “equity multiplier”. It is interesting to note that
both the unit-proﬁt and the "equity multiplier" are lower under the risky project
(lower π), therefore the proﬁt per unit of entrepreneur’s wealth (Φ(π)) is larger
in the safe project (high π).13
2.2 The Technology Adoption
Once C and RB are ﬁxed (for a given W and therefore for I), the limited
liability characteristic of the debt contract and the same expected return of
12By assumption the project’s net present value of shirking is lower than the one with eﬀort
(even considering the private beneﬁt), this implies that: πR+( 1−π)L>(π − ∆πe)R +( 1−
π + ∆πe)L + B, therefore R − L> B
∆πe .
13(πR +( 1− π)αL − 1) = Ω − (1 − π)(1 − α)L
and
1 − π(R − B
∆πe ) − (θ − π)αL =1− π(R − αL − B
∆πe )+αθL
6both technologies imply that an entrepreneur would always choose the risky
technology. This is the standard "asset substitution moral hazard" ﬁrst pointed




(W + C)π(R − RB) − W
where π(R − RB)=Ω − π(RB − L) − L
For both cases, that is, if the bank believes that the entrepreneur will choose
either the high or low risk technology, the term in parenthesis (RB − L =
(R− B
∆πe)−L ) is positive, therefore the entrepreneur’s expected proﬁti sh i g h e r
with the risky technology.14
2.3 Bank Project Evaluation
Given that banks are competitive and therefore always break even, a bank
decides to evaluate the project before lending if and only if the entrepreneur’s
proﬁts are higher with monitoring (Π(W,ψ)) than without it (Π(W,0)). We
already know that once I and RB are ﬁxed, the entrepreneur would always
adopt the risky technology unless he or she is forced by the bank to use the safe
one. Therefore, using equation [3], the bank would monitor the entrepreneur if
and only if:
Π(W,ψ) > Π(W,0) ⇔ (W − ψ)Φ(πs) − ψ>WΦ(πr)
From the previous section, we know that the proﬁtp e ru n i to fe n t r e p r e n e u r ’ s
wealth is larger for the safe technology (Φ(πs) > Φ(πr)), therefore the bank




ψ = W (4)
The previous inequality and equation [2] lead to our main results:
C
I





|W>W = πs(R −
B
∆πe)+( 1− πs)αL
Due to low levels of wealth, projects undertaken by small ﬁrms (W ≤ W)
are riskier than the ones undertaken by large ﬁrms. This occurs because in
equilibrium the former choose the risky technology (low π). Such risky choice
implies that their equilibrium leverage will be lower than that of large ﬁrms
(R − B
∆πe >α L ). In addition, for both types of ﬁrms an improvement in
14This is true by the assumption that the net present value of shirking is lower than the
one with eﬀort. See footnote 11.
7creditor rights (α) will increase the ﬁrm’s leverage (C
I ). However, the increase
will be larger for small ﬁrms (W ≤ W).
With a continuum of entrepreneurs with wealth between Wmin and Wmax,
the previous results imply that entrepreneurs with wealth between Wmin and
W(πr,πs,α,ψ) have a ﬁrm size and a leverage level equal to WE Q (πr,B,α)
and (πr(R− B
∆πe)+(1−πr)αL) ,respectively. Entrepreneurs with wealth above
W(πr,πs,α,ψ) have a ﬁrm size equals to (W − ψ) EQ(πr,B,α) and leverage
level (πs(R − B
∆πe)+( 1− πs)αL). Figure 2 shows the relationship between
ﬁrm size and wealth. The empirical section of this paper tests these results
assuming that entrepreneurs in small and medium sized enterprises (SME) have
a low initial level of wealth.15
3D a t a
This section describes the data sources and the variables used in the empirical
analysis. Our main sources of data is the World Business Environment Survey
(WBES),16 and several research pieces that have gathered valuable information
on the state of creditor protection around the world17. For the purposes of this
paper the dependent variable is the leverage of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The
theoretical section above suggests that access to credit, deﬁned as the share of
investment ﬁnanced with banking credit, depends on creditor rights, the size of
ﬁrms, and the interaction of these two.
The WBES is a ﬁrm-level data set that consists of responses by more than
10,000 ﬁrms across the world to diﬀerent questions related to a country’s busi-
ness environment. The survey was carried out in 1999 and 2000. The survey
includes questions that describe the ﬁnancing structure of ﬁrms. Enterprise
managers were asked to report how much of their investment was ﬁnanced over
the last year, from the following sources: i) retained earnings, ii) funds from
family and friends, iii) equity, iv) supplier credit, v) leasing arrangements, vi)
money lenders, vii) other public sector support, viii) local commercial banks,
ix) foreign banks, x) development banks, xi) and others. For our purposes we
deﬁne the dependent variable as the sum of the fraction of investment ﬁnanced
using credit provided by local commercial banks and foreign banks and label it
as "access to bank credit"18.
15
In this setup we can include a ﬁx e dc o s tt oh a v ea c c e s st oc r e d i t( γ). In this case, Entre-
preneurs with wealth below Wcc have no credit. Where Wcc =
EQM(π,B,α)
EQM(π,B,α)−1γ.
16This new dataset has been recently used in various cross country studies. See Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) or Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven and Maksimovic
(2004) for an example.
17See for example La Porta et al (1997, 1998) and Djankov et al (2003).
18It is important to note that there may be problems with the measurements of these vari-
ables individually, given the ambiguous way in which the question was asked. It is unclear if
the interpretation of the foreign bank question was the same across countries and entrepre-
neurs. Some respondents could have interpreted foreign banks as oﬀshore lenders, in which
8When constructing the access to bank credit variable we are very careful in
dropping erroneous data. We drop all ﬁrms that report that the sum of their
funding sources is less than 90% and also drop those that report that their
funding sources exceed 110%. We allow the possibility of small mistakes in the
respondents addition, but eliminate excessively erroneous data.
Another crucial ﬁrm level variable in our analysis is the size of ﬁrms. Once
again this is obtained from the WBES. The WBES classiﬁes ﬁrms into three
diﬀerent size groups: small ﬁrms are deﬁned as those with more than 5 and
less than 50 workers, medium are those with more than 50 but less than 500,
and large as those with more than 500. Other ﬁrm level variables included in
our empirical analysis that can aﬀect access to ﬁnance such as the ownership
structure, the export orientation, the economic sector in which the ﬁrm operates,
are detailed in the Appendix.
To measure creditor protection we use a set of variables frequently cited
in related literature19. The variables are measures of certain institutions and
rules and regulation that directly aﬀect the extent to which creditors can seize
collateral eﬀectively and eﬃciently. We use a measure of rule of law that captures
the degree of law enforcement in a country. Presumably in countries with poor
rule of law, credit contracts tend to be less enforced than where rule of law is
high. We use a direct measure of creditor rights based on La Porta et al. (1997)
that measures the degree of creditors ’ control on the assets of debtors in case
of bankruptcy. Following Galindo and Micco(2004), we modify this variable
slightly by interacting it with the rule of law in order to capture the extent of
law enforcement on what is eﬀectively written in bankruptcy laws. This variable
is denoted as eﬀective creditor rights.
Other variables included in the empirical analysis are the extent to which
property rights are protected, the duration of a bankruptcy procedure and ﬁnally
the legal origin20. While more institutional variables have been used in other
empirical studies, we focus on these ﬁve which are strictly related to the issue
of creditor rights protections that this paper wants to address. Details on the
variables, their source and construction are found in Appendix 1.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the data set used in our study. The
table shows that developed countries on average have higher values for the
creditor protection measures than developing ones. Also of interest is that
large ﬁrms in developed countries appear to have a lower share of bank credit
than ﬁrms in developing ones. This could be explained by the fact that in
developed countries ﬁrms have access to other external sources of ﬁnance such
as equity markets. This however, should be particularly true for large ﬁrms;
case the local bank would capture lending from local banks that are foreign owned, while oth-
ers could have interpreted them as local (onshore) lenders owned by foreign parties in which
case the local banks variable would capture only lending by local banks that are owned by
a party of the same country. However when taking both items together this problem is not
present. Moreover, the model does not refer to bank lenders of speciﬁc nationalities. In theory
both national and foreign parties will be aﬀected in the same way by creditor protections.
19See La Porta el al (1997 and 1998), and Galindo and Micco (2004).
20Several authors have linked a common law legal origin with better protection of creditors.
See for example La Porta et al (1997 and 1998).
9small ﬁrms tend to rely more on banking credit. When we focus on small
ﬁrms exclusively we ﬁnd that bank ﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly larger in developed
countries relative to developing ones. In developed countries small ﬁrms ﬁnance
about 19.6% of their investment with bank credit. In developing countries this
share is only 10.7 %. It is worth noting that, on a country-wide level, the
pairwise correlation between ﬁrm access to bank credit and a traditional measure
of ﬁnancial development (ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP) is 54%
and signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Excluding developed countries the
correlation rises to 64%. This data is hence validated by commonly used macro
data.
The following section proposes an empirical strategy to explore the main
issues of our model using the data set described above and then reports the
results.
4 Econometric Methods
The theoretical model above suggests that relative to large ﬁrms, small ﬁrms
should have less access to credit in countries where creditor rights are unpro-
tected. In order to test this formally we estimate two type of empirical models
designed to test if the ﬁnancing gap between small and large ﬁrms and medium-
sized and large ﬁrms is larger in countries where creditors are unprotected. As
proxies of creditor protection we use the whole range of variables described in
the previous section. Both sets of estimates use as dependent variable the share
of ﬁnancing coming from banks described in the previous section, but they diﬀer
in the way it is used.
The ﬁrst set of estimates uses country averages by groups of ﬁrms. Firms
are grouped according to their size. Using this methodology we have three ob-
servations per country: the average of the share of bank ﬁnancing for small,
medium and large ﬁrms in each country of our sample21. We regress this vari-
able against dummy variables indicating the size of the ﬁrms in the group (small
and medium), against interactions of these dummies and the variables proxying
for creditor protections, and against country speciﬁc dummies. This approach
allows us to use country ﬁxed eﬀects to control for all observable and unobserv-
able country characteristics. In particular, it allows us to control for diﬀerences
in country business opportunities, volatility, level of investment risk and any
institutional diﬀerence across countries. This approach also alleviates the po-
tential problem of endogeneity of regulations present in cross-country analysis.
Thus, by using data by size groups and controlling for country-wide diﬀerences
across nations with country ﬁxed eﬀects we account for the feedback from ﬁ-
nancial development in terms of ﬁrms ’ access to credit to regulations22.N o t e
21We drop groups in which we have fewer than 15 ﬁrms to compute the averages. That is,
if a country does not have at least 15 observations in a size group, that size group for that
speciﬁc country is dropped out of the sample.
22For example, it can be argued that more stringent regulations protecting creditors may
arise as ﬁnancial markets develop.
10that including ﬁxed eﬀects does not allow us to estimate the direct impact of
creditor protection on access to credit, but rather allows us to estimate if the
ﬁnancing gap between large and small ﬁrms and large and medium sized ﬁrms
depends on creditor protections, as suggested by the model above. Given that
the dependent variable is naturally truncated between 0 and 1, we estimate a
two-limit tobit model.
Results using the country-group averages are reported in table 4, and are in
the direction suggested by theory. The coeﬃcients on the size variables reﬂect
what is fairly obvious, namely that access to banking credit is lower for small
and medium-sized ﬁrms. According to these estimates, on average small ﬁrms
ﬁnance nearly 10 percentage points less of investment with bank credit than
large ﬁrms, and medium-sized ﬁrms nearly 5 percentage points less than large
ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients on the interactions show that as creditor protection
increases the gap is reduced. Note that the coeﬃcients on the interaction of
the small size and creditor protection are signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, and
in most of them at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Except for column 4 (which uses
the duration of bankruptcy procedures as the proxy variable) the interaction
between creditor protection and the medium size dummy is also signiﬁcant with
the expected sign, indicating that medium-sized ﬁrms also have better chances
to access credit markets when creditors are protected. In all regressions, as we
should expect, the positive eﬀect of creditor protection is larger for small ﬁrms
than for medium ones.
These results should be interpreted with caution since they mix diﬀerent
types of ﬁrms in each group. For example, groups include ﬁrms that because
o ft h e i rl i n eo fa c t i v i t yh a v em o r ec o llateral than others (manufacturing ﬁrms)
with those that because of their activities tend to have less collateral, and hence
are less likely to access banking credit. In addition groups include ﬁrms that
are subject to diﬀerent types of shocks, such as exporting and non-exporting
ﬁrms, or ﬁrms that have access to diﬀerent types of guarantees, such as publicly
owned and foreign owned ones. Controlling for such factors is crucial in order
to pinpoint whether the diﬀerences in bank ﬁnancing come from diﬀerences in
creditor protection or for other reasons that aﬀect ﬁrm ﬁnance.
In order to fully exploit the data set and control for relevant ﬁrm level char-
acteristics that may aﬀect access to bank ﬁnance we also estimate empirical
models at the ﬁrm level. In such cases the dependent variable is not aggre-
gated by country-group, but rather the ﬁrm observation of the share of bank
credit itself. In these estimations we control for variables commonly used in
this literature, such as whether the ﬁrm has an export orientation, the ﬁrm’s
ownership structure (whether it is government owned or foreign owned), and
sectoral dummies indicating the area in which the ﬁrm operates. As above, we
include size dummies (Small and Medium) and interactions between these and
the measures of creditor protection. Also as above we control for country ﬁxed
eﬀects to capture any institutional or macroeconomic variable that can also af-
fect access to banking credit. Given that the size dummies are interacted with
variables that do not vary at the country level, we use clustered standard errors
11to adjust them.23
Results are reported in table 5. With respect to ﬁrm level controls we ﬁnd
that exporters ﬁnance around 9 percent more of their investment with bank
loans than ﬁrms oriented to the domestic market. Foreign and state-owned
ﬁrms have less access to credit than local private ﬁrms, though the coeﬃcient
on foreign ownership is not diﬀerent from zero. Finally, although not reported
in the tables, ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector, perhaps due to the tangibility
of their assets, have greater access to bank loans.
Focusing on the variables of interest to this study, we ﬁnd that in fact the
size of the ﬁnancing gap between large and small ﬁrms depends on creditor
protections. All of the interactions with the small dummy are signiﬁcant, and
the signs are as suggested by theory. An increase in creditor protection reduces
t h es i z eo ft h eﬁnancing gap. Results for reductions in the ﬁnancing gap between
large and medium-sized ﬁrms are weaker but also show up in these estimations.
Once again, to obtain a view of the economic magnitude consider column 2 where
the results using the eﬀective creditor rights index are depicted. According to
these results an increase in eﬀective creditor rights from the 20th to the 80th
percentile of the distribution reduces the ﬁnancing gap of small and large ﬁrms
in nearly 10 percentage points. These are large numbers if we consider that for
a country in the 20th percentile of creditor rights the estimated size of the gap
between access to bank ﬁnance of small and large ﬁrms is close to 25 percentage
points.
The last column of the table uses legal origin as a proxy for creditor rights.
The interpretation of the results is straight forward. In common law countries,
the diﬀerence in the share of investment ﬁnanced with bank credit between
large and small ﬁrms is approximately 9 percentage points. In non-common law
countries this diﬀerence is 25 percentage points.
5R o b u s t n e s s
This section present some robustness exercises in order to conﬁrm that the
results presented in the previous section are not driven by sample selection or
by the way the dependent variable is deﬁned. In order to test if the level of
development rather than creditor protection is guiding the results reported in
the previous section, we reestimate the equations above including an interaction
between the small and medium dummies and a dummy indicating the income
level of the country where the ﬁrm is located. We deﬁne three income levels
following World Bank classiﬁcations24. The results are reported in table 6. After
23See Judson and Owen (1996) .
24In the high income group country we include OECD high-income countries. In terms
of our sample these include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal,Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom and United States. In the middle income group we include Albania, Ar-
gentina, Armenia,Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Rep, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Trinidad and
12controlling for income level, the interaction of the size dummies with rule of law,
eﬀe c t i v ec r e d i t o rr i g h t sa n dt h el e g a lc o d ed u m m yr e m a i ns i g n i ﬁcant. Some
signiﬁcance is lost in the regressions including property rights and the duration
of bankruptcy procedures, though the sign remains unaltered. It is interesting to
note the magnitude of the interactions of the income level dummy with the size
dummy. The absolute magnitude of the coeﬃcient of such interaction increases
as the level of development decreases. The diﬀerence between bank ﬁnancing
between large and small ﬁrms is larger in low-income countries. It should be
noted however, that in high-income countries the interaction is not signiﬁcant.
This again is consistent with the notion that in these countries bank ﬁnance can
be less relevant for large ﬁrms, given that they have developed capital markets.
In addition to the exercise above, we reestimate the empirical model for
a smaller sample of countries that includes only developing countries (middle
and low-income countries as deﬁned above). These results are reported in table
7, and they are basically identical to those reported previously. Nonetheless,
the results are weaker when analyzing interactions between the medium-sized
dummy and the creditor protection measures. Possibly what is driving these
results is the very deﬁnition of medium-sized ﬁrms. While ﬁrms with more than
50 but fewer than 500 employees may be thought of as medium sized in developed
countries, it is possible that these are large ﬁrms in developing countries. Given
this situation, it is not surprising that we do not ﬁnd consistent signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between medium and large ﬁrms. In any case it is worth stressing
that even for a sample with similar levels of development there is still evidence
that creditor protection reduces the ﬁnancing gap between large and small ﬁrms.
An alternative robustness test in order to guarantee that results are not
driven by outliers is to reestimate the regressions repeatedly, dropping a single
country in each estimation and analyzing the size and signiﬁcance of the co-
eﬃcients. In other words, we replicate the estimation several times, each time
dropping the set of ﬁrms correpsonding with a speciﬁc country. Summary results
of this exercise are reported in table 8. We show the extreme values (maximum
and minimum) of the coeﬀcients on the small and medium dummy as well as
their interaction with the legal origin dummy, and their standard errors are re-
ported. Regarding the small size dummy and its interaction with the protection
proxy, there are no signiﬁcant changes when eliminating any speciﬁc country;
this indicates that the results are not driven by any outlier country.
Finally, we perform robustness tests that consider changes to the dependent
variable. As discussed in Section 3 the WBES survey explores diﬀerent sources
of funding for ﬁrms. Regarding bank credit, the survey asks for the share of
the ﬁrms investment ﬁnanced by domestic commercial banks, foreign banks and
development banks. Throughout the paper we chose to focus on the information
provided for ﬁnancing from private banks (domestic and foreign) exclusively.
We did not include development bank credit given that credit from these
institutions may respond to diﬀerent incentives than those from private banks.
Tobago,Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay and Venezuela. Finally in the low-income group we include
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Georgia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Kyrgizstan, Moldova,
Nicaragua, Pakistan and Uzbekistan.
13In addition, development banks and commercial banks have diﬀerent utility
functions. Development banks usually have some type of social mandate that
guides their credit decisions. These are not necessarily related with making
sound ﬁnancial decisions and tend to be more oriented toward political rather
than economic incentives. Better creditor protection improves the management
of ﬁnancial risks, which is more likely to be part of the utility function of com-
mercial banks rather than part of the utility function of development banks. If
development banks are doing their job, they should be providing funds to ﬁrms
that for some reason do not have access to credit markets. One of those rea-
sons can be poor creditor protection. Including development bank credit could
potentially reduce the impact of creditor protection on access to credit.
In columns 1 and 2 of table 9 we report estimations using a redeﬁned mea-
sure of access to bank credit that includes credit from development banks. To
reduce the amount of output we report results using only two of the ﬁve prox-
ies used throughout the study, eﬀective creditor rights and legal origin. Even
when including this new source of credit in the speciﬁcation, results remain
strong for the interactions with the small size dummy but the signiﬁcance of the
interactions with the medium sized dummy falls.
F i n a l l y ,i nc o l u m n s3a n d4w er e p o r tt h es a m et y p eo fe s t i m a t i o n sf o r
another deﬁnition of the dependent variable. In this case we exclude foreign
bank credit and concentrate only on credit provided by local domestic privately
owned banks. The results are basically identical supporting the view that greater
creditor protection reduces the ﬁnancing gap between large and small ﬁrms.
Additional robustness exercises in which we control for the diﬀerential im-
pact on small and medium ﬁrms of diﬀerent banking structure characteristics,
such as the share of banking assets owned by the government, the degree of
concentration of the banking industry and if countries have or not an explicit
deposit insurance mechanism, are reported in appendix 2. The basic results of
the paper hold when including such controls.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Information asymmetries tend to increase ﬁnancial restrictions for smaller cred-
itors that usually have fewer assets to pledge as collateral. The main intuition
behind this result is that lenders face monitoring costs in order to reduce moral
hazard. Unfortunately, this monitoring action has a ﬁxed cost per loan, and
therefore is only worthwhile when the borrower has a high level of wealth, which
implies a high level of investment. In equilibrium banks will not monitor small
ﬁrms (entrepreneurs with low initial wealth), and therefore these ﬁrms will use
the risky technology that implies a higher probability of bankruptcy. This fact
implies that any policy that reduces ineﬃciencies in the bankruptcy procedure
will have a greater positive eﬀect on small than on large ﬁrms. Using a model
based on Hölmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998) and Bester and Hellwig (1987) we
formalized this idea. Our model has three testable implications. First, large
ﬁrms tend to be more leveraged than small ﬁrms; second, large ﬁrms tend to
14be less volatile than small ﬁrms due to their technology adoption; and third,
improvements in contract enforcement or on the eﬃciency of bankruptcy pro-
cedures increases access to credit for small ﬁrms relative to large ones.
This paper reviews evidence on the degree of creditor rights protection and
access to credit for small and medium-size enterprises. Results are drawn from
as u r v e yo fﬁrms around the world to explore the role of creditor protection
on small and medium-size enterprises’ access to credit. In particular, we test
whether the share of ﬁrm investment ﬁnanced with bank credit depends on
legal protections and ﬁrm size. Concurring with the predictions of our model,
we present evidence that small ﬁrms are less leveraged and more volatile than
large ones. In addition, using econometric techniques that allow us to deal with
observed and unobserved country speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t sa sw e l la sw i t hp a r t i a l
endogeneity, we ﬁnd that better protection of creditors reduces the ﬁnancing gap
between small and large ﬁrms. The degree to which smaller ﬁrms are constrained
depends on the quality of the regulatory framework, suggesting that in countries
where creditor rights are prote c t e d( a n de n f o r c e d ) ,s m a l l e rﬁrms have greater
access to bank credit to ﬁnance investment. In our sample this eﬀect is large. In
common law countries (where creditor protection is high), the diﬀerence in the
share of investment ﬁnanced with bank credit between large and small ﬁrms is
approximately 9 percentage points. In non-common law countries this diﬀerence
is 25 percentage points.
157 Appendix 1: Data Sources
Variable Definition Source
Firm Level Data
Share of Bank Finance
Enterprise managers responses when asked how much of their investment was 
financed over the last year with credit from local commercial banks. For 
robustness exercises we use definitions that include credit from foreign banks 
and credit from development banks.
World Business Environment Survey 




Dummy variable equal to one if any government agency or state body has a 
financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise.
WBES
Foreign Ownership
Dummy variable equal to one if any foreign company or individual has a 
financial stake in the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise.
WBES
Institutional Data
Rule of Law Composite Rule of Law Indicator
World bank governance indicators 
dataset. Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gover
nance/govdata2002/index.html
Effective Creditor Rights 
Index
Interaction between a creditor rights index and the rule of law indicator. The 
creditor rights index is an indicator of creditor rights in insolvency, based on 
the methodology of La Porta et al (1997 and 1998). The indicator measures 
four powers of secured lenders in liquidation and reorganization: (i) whether 
there are restrictions on entering reorganization, (ii) whether secured creditors 
are able to seize their collateral after the decision for reorganization is 
approved, in other words whether there is no "automatic stay" or "asset 
freeze" imposed by the court. (iii) whether secured creditors are paid first out 
of the proceeds from liquidating a bankrupt firm and (iv) whether an 
administrator is responsible for management of the business during the 
resolution of reorganization, instead of having the management of the 
bankrupt debtor continue to run the business. A value of 1 is assigned for 
each variable when a country's laws and regulations provide these powers for 
secured creditors. The aggregate creditor rights index sums the total score 
across all four variables. 
The data is available at the doing 





Assesment on whether financial assets and wealth are clearly delineated and 
protected by law
Global Competitiveness Report
Duration of Bankruptcy 
Procedures
Calendar years that a bankruptcy usually procedure takes. The variable 
captures the average duration that insolvency lawyers estimate is necessary to 
complete a procedure. The measure represents the actual time of the 
insolvency proceedings, not the time that the law may mandate.
The data is available at the doing 





Dummy variable equal to one if a country has a common law legal origin and 
zero otherwise.
Djankov et al (2003)
168 Appendix 2: Additional Controls
Regression Results Using Firm Level Data, Controling for banking structure characteristics
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
12345
Exporting Firm 7.926 8.241 8.352 8.656 8.169
[2.028]*** [2.023]*** [2.070]*** [2.089]*** [2.028]***
Government Ownership -11.799 -11.706 -11.167 -12.877 -12.328
[3.126]*** [3.303]*** [3.181]*** [3.415]*** [3.207]***
Foreign Ownership 0.155 -0.736 -0.797 -0.879 -0.328
[2.798] [2.846] [2.859] [2.919] [2.777]
Small -56.043 -25.076 -29.78 -1.755 -15.499
[17.377]***[15.246] [16.113]* [14.234] [13.766]
Medium -43.953 -25.893 -29.296 -20.328 -23.655
[15.188]***[12.804]** [14.814]** [12.471] [11.933]**
Small*GOV 7.406 -6.359 -7.912 6.775 -6.919
[14.887] [15.329] [14.948] [16.487] [15.818]
Medium*GOV 22.535 18.356 8.73 28.247 19.281
[10.776]** [12.098] [10.979] [13.131]** [12.549]
Small*CONCENT -8.819 -3.364 -11.522 2.637 -2.971
[8.581] [7.946] [8.159] [7.551] [8.015]
Medium*CONCENT 0.192 2.133 -0.055 3.919 2.437
[7.132] [6.719] [6.667] [6.463] [6.683]
Small*D_Ins 5.981 4.355 -3.255 -16.432 -5.845
[15.018] [18.539] [15.231] [18.875] [16.546]
Medium*D_Ins 23.942 18.717 20.972 14.815 18.913
[13.875]* [16.308] [13.610] [16.979] [15.052]
Small*rule of law 70.777
[17.776]***
Medium*rule of law 35.55
[15.419]**
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 24.319
[13.985]*






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -4.241
[1.251]***
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -1.012
[0.963]
Small*Common Law Origin 12.086
[6.552]*
Medium*Common Law Origin 1.939
[6.199]
Observations 5230 5101 4404 5031 5230
N u m b e r  o f  C o u n t r i e s 5 04 94 24 85 0
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government 
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij * 
Protection Proxyj  + β8*Smallij * GOBj + β9*Mediumij * GOBj  + + β10*Smallij * CONCENTj + β11*Mediumij * 
CONCENTj  +  β12*Smallij * D_Insj + β13*Mediumij * D_Insj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the 
country.  Share of bank lending is the share of investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a 
dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if 
the firm has any government ownership and 0 otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has 
any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise.
Small and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 
and less than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. GOB is the share of assets of the banking system owned by 
government owned banks, CONCENT is a measure of concentration of the banking industry that represents the share of 
banking system's assets owned by the 5 largest banks, and D_Ins is a dummy variable taking value 1 when there is an 
explicit deposit insurance system in the country. Dij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in 
country j. hj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1: Share of Bank Credit - Average Values




The source of the data is the WBES and  is computed based on firm level surveys. Small firms are defined as 
those with thes than 50 workers but more than 5. Medium sized firms are those with more than 50 but less than 
500. Large firms are those with more than 500 workers. The countries included in the sample are: Albania, 
Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia,Canada, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Rep, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad&Tobago, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States, Uzbekistan,and Venezuela
Table 2: Job Reallocation by Firm Size
Plant Size Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico U.S.A 
less than 50 workers 0.40 0.40 0.29 0.18 0.34
50-100 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.26
100-250 0.30 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.20
more than 250 0.21 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.14
Period 1991-2000 1986-1999 1977-1999 1993-2000 1973-1988
Sector All Enterprises Manuf. Manuf. Manuf  Manuf.
Job Turnover is defined as the sum of the absolute value of plant's employment changes divided 
by the average total employment in years t-1 and t.Sources: Davis,Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) 
and IDB (2004) 
21Table 3: Summary Statistics
Share of Bank 
Credit in Small 
Firms (%)
Share of Bank 
Credit in Medium 
Sized Firms (%)
Share of Bank 













                Mean  11.4 17.1 25.7 0.5 0.3 4.3 2.9
                Standard Deviation  10.1 11.7 14.6 0.2 0.2 1.2 2.3
Developing Country Sample
                Mean  10.7 17.0 26.3 0.5 0.2 3.9 3.1
                Standard Deviation  9.3 11.9 14.5 0.1 0.2 1.1 2.4
Developed Country Sample
                Mean  19.6 18.3 19.9 0.8 0.4 5.7 1.8
                Standard Deviation  11.8 11.4 16.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8
The first three columns in the table report the average share of investment financed with credit from private banks in small firms, 
medium sized firm and large firms respectively. The data ranges between 0 and 100%, and the source is the WBES. The column 4 
reports a Rule of Law index normalized between 0 and 1. Larger values mean higher rule of law. Column 5 reports a measure of 
effective creditor rights that interacts La Porta et al (1997) measure of creditor rights with the rule of law index. Effective creditor 
rights is also bounded between 0 and 1; higher values means higher creditor rights protection. Column 6 reports a measure of property 
rights protection. The minimum value of the index is 1 and the maximum is 7. Higher values reflect greater protection of property 
rights. Column 7 reports the duration of bankruptcy procedures in years. Higher values imply a longer procedure. The source of the 
data is reported in the appendix.
The sample of developing countries incluyes Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belice, Bolivia, Bosnia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgizstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Moldova, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, 
Trinidad&Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistán, and Venezuela. The sample of developed countries incluyes Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.
22Table 4: Regression Results Using Country-Size Level Data
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Averqage Value per Country-Group)
1234 5
Small -26.575 -13.077 -24.905 -6.245 -10.394
[3.037]*** [1.735]*** [3.852]*** [1.858]*** [1.205]***
Medium -16.162 -6.182 -16.244 -2.175 -4.359
[3.004]*** [1.709]*** [3.764]*** [1.830] [1.164]***
Small*rule of law 34.111
[5.516]***
Medium*rule of law 24.76
[5.45]***
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 18.359
[5.784]***






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.979
[0.502]*
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.468
[0.489]
Small*Common Law Origin 9.856
[3.069]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 7.584
[3.053]**
Observations 156 152 128 149 156
Number of Countries 61 59 48 58 61
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Smallij + β2*Mediumij + 
β3*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β4*Mediumij * Protection Proxyj + ηj + εij. i denotes the sector size (small,
medium, or large) and j denotes the country. Share of bank lending is the average share of investment financed
with bank credit in firms of size i in country j. Small and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have
more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise.
ηj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
23Table 5: Regression Results Using Firm Level Data
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
12345
Exporting Firm 8.837 9.252 8.779 9.694 9.119
[1.947]*** [1.953]*** [2.011]*** [2.030]*** [1.968]***
Government Ownership -9.398 -9.895 -9.045 -10.634 -9.802
[2.999]*** [3.102]*** [3.188]*** [3.206]*** [3.036]***
Foreign Ownership -0.696 -1.43 -3.251 -1.603 -1.087
[2.696] [2.793] [2.700] [2.864] [2.691]
Small -55.162 -29.613 -39.6 -13.742 -24.741
[9.156]*** [4.253]*** [8.962]*** [4.735]*** [3.437]***
Medium -23.976 -10.428 -21.467 -5.287 -8.047
[8.057]*** [3.510]*** [8.879]** [4.050] [2.810]***
Small*rule of law 64.147
[14.850]***
Medium*rule of law 33.948
[13.432]**
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 30.031
[9.574]***






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -2.934
[1.109]***
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.379
[0.843]
Small*Common Law Origin 15.781
[5.538]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 9.39
[4.813]*
Observations 6153 5998 4865 5928 6153
Number of Countries 62 60 49 59 62
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government 
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij * 
Protection Proxyj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country.  Share of bank lending is the share of 
investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports 
and 0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 
otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small 
and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less 
than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. Dij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in 
country j. ηj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.
24Table 6: Regression Results Using Firm Level Data (Controlling by level of income)
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
Exporting Firm 8.859 9.245 8.746 9.719 9.079
[1.976]*** [1.970]*** [2.053]*** [2.037]*** [1.966]***
Government Ownership -9.815 -10.626 -9.618 -11.406 -10.395
[2.994]*** [3.110]*** [3.196]*** [3.183]*** [3.015]***
Foreign Ownership -0.836 -1.198 -3.248 -1.192 -0.758
[2.667] [2.773] [2.687] [2.848] [2.674]
Small*Low Income -48.537 -41.455 -26.886 -29.925 -39.336
[10.325]*** [8.311]*** [8.811]*** [9.368]*** [7.842]***
Medium* Low Income -29.426 -16.353 -27.009 -10.308 -14.659
[9.540]*** [7.218]** [10.191]*** [8.578] [6.846]**
Small*Middle Income -40.812 -28.707 -28.606 -18.846 -25.838
[10.792]*** [4.203]*** [9.842]*** [4.925]*** [3.437]***
Medium* Middle Income -30.27 -10.931 -22.134 -6.157 -7.573
[9.842]*** [3.448]*** [9.495]** [4.226] [2.764]***
Small*High Income -18.968 1.673 -0.654 12.33 4.258
[16.375] [7.467] [14.614] [7.371]* [7.326]
Medium* High Income -39.224 -6.206 -22.503 0.382 -3.316
[15.198]*** [7.211] [13.935] [6.818] [6.677]
Small*rule of law 34.147
[17.084]**
Medium*rule of law 47.893
[16.899]***
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 20.594
[9.441]**






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -1.895
[1.183]
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.141
[0.951]
Small*Common Law Origin 13.767
[5.231]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 10.061
[5.140]*
Observations 6153 5998 4865 5928 6153
N u m b e r  o f  C o u n t r i e s 6 26 04 95 96 2
Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in country j. ηj is a country fixed effect. The 
dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1. Low Income, Medium Income and High Income countries are dummies 
indicating the income level of a country following World Bank classification.
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij 
+β2*Government Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij * Low Incomej+ β5*Mediumij   * Low Incomej 
+ β6*Smallij * Medium Incomej + β7*Mediumij * Medium Incomej + β8*Smallij * High Incomej + β9*Mediumij * 
High Income j + β10*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β11*Mediumij * Protection Proxyj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the 
firm and j denotes the country.  Share of bank lending is the share of investment financed with bank credit in i in 
country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise. Government 
ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 otherwise. Foreign 
ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small and Medium 
are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than 
500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. 
25Table 7: Regression Results Using Firm Level Data (Sample of Developing Countries)
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
12345
Exporting Firm 9.109 9.615 9.002 10.137 9.517
[2.153]*** [2.145]*** [2.244]*** [2.249]*** [2.144]***
Government Ownership -9.19 -10.085 -8.599 -10.922 -10.146
[3.153]*** [3.267]*** [3.383]** [3.375]*** [3.175]***
Foreign Ownership 0.598 0.228 -2.058 0.223 0.686
[2.825] [2.942] [2.825] [3.038] [2.821]
Small -43.617 -32.761 -26.378 -19.157 -27.81
[9.945]*** [4.364]*** [9.264]*** [5.097]*** [3.516]***
Medium -26.899 -12.141 -19.92 -5.81 -7.856
[9.411]*** [3.592]*** [9.591]** [4.397] [2.883]***
Small*rule of law 38.596
[17.053]**
Medium*rule of law 41.819
[16.659]**
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 30.426
[8.896]***






Small*Duration of Bankruptcy -2.201
[1.135]*
Medium*Duration of Bankruptcy -0.34
[0.880]
Small*Common Law Origin 15.432
[5.191]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 6.934
[4.622]
Observations 5600 5445 4312 5375 5600
Number of Countries 53 51 40 50 53
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β 2 *Governmen
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij *P r o t e c t i o n
Proxyj +D ij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country. Share of bank lending is the share of investment financed
with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise.
Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 otherwise. Foreign
ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small and Medium are dummies
taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than 500 workers respectively
a n d0o t h e r w i s e .D ij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in country j. ηj is a country fixed effect.
The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1.















Small Minimum Value -63.236 -32.147 -49.73 -15.866 -26.618
[8.605]** [4.228]** [7.893]** [4.797]** [3.429]**
Maximum Value -51.095 -28.17 -37.042 -10.925 -23.346
[8.739]** [4.107]** [8.918]** [4.347]* [3.321]**
Small*Protection Proxy Minimum Value 55.836 25.882 4.191 -4.107 13.246
[14.808]** [9.432]** [1.962]* [1.319]** [5.419]*
Maximum Value 75.736 34.336 6.976 -2.4 19.21
[14.063]** [9.352]** [1.771]** [1.167]* [5.772]**
Medium Minimum Value -26.14 -11.52 -25.762 -6.786 -8.787
[8.036]** [3.487]** [9.704]** [4.163] [2.809]**
Maximum Value -21.893 -9.305 -18.117 -3.36 -7.126
[7.975]** [3.539]** [8.592]* [4.417] [2.786]*
Medium*Protection Proxy Minimum Value 30.47 9.411 2.925 -1.286 7.316
[13.845]* [10.893] [1.885] [1.070] [4.979]
Maximum Value 38.646 19.074 4.462 0.162 13.663
[13.085]** [8.598]* [2.082]* [0.825] [4.570]**
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government 
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij 
*Protection Proxyj  + Dij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country.  Share of bank lending is the share of 
investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports 
and 0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0 
otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise.
 Small and Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and 
less than 500 workers respectively and 0 otherwise. The protection proxies are defined as in the previous tables. The 
dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1. Succesive regressions are dropped, and in each one country at a time is 
dropped. The table reports the maximum and minimum variables of a set of relevant coefficients obtained in this exercise.
27Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable: Share of Bank Finance (Firm Level)
123 4
Exporting Firm 8.778 8.823 4.01 4.183
[1.871]*** [1.881]*** [2.223]* [2.175]*
Government Ownership -5.604 -5.674 14.567 12.122
[3.084]* [3.018]* [5.114]*** [4.942]**
Foreign Ownership -0.507 -0.098 -15.819 -14.901
[2.784] [2.702] [3.297]*** [3.165]***
Small -32.129 -24.092 -23.335 -20.753
[4.115]*** [3.337]*** [4.665]*** [3.768]***
Medium -9.212 -6.03 -0.143 0.146
[3.275]*** [2.670]** [3.808] [3.100]
Small*Ef. Creditor Rights 37.706 24.158
[9.583]*** [10.744]**
Medium*Ef. Creditor Rights 14.812 4.426
[8.701]* [9.949]
Small*Common Law Origin 11.681 19.153
[5.218]** [5.005]***
Medium*Common Law Origin 4.473 3.737
[4.539] [4.375]
Observations 5998 6153 5998 6153
Number of Countries 60 62 60 62
Sector of Operation Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
The estimated model is a two limit Tobit of the form: Share of Bank Lendingij = β1*Exporting Firmij +β2*Government
Ownershipij +β3*Foreign Ownershipij +β4*Smallij + β5*Mediumij + β6*Smallij * Protection Proxyj + β7*Mediumij * 
Protection Proxyj +D ij + ηj + εij. i denotes the firm and j denotes the country. Share of bank lending is the share of
investment financed with bank credit in i in country j. Exporting firm is a dummy that takes values 1 if the firm exports and
0 otherwise. Government ownership is a dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has any government ownership and 0
otherwise. Foreign ownership is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any foreign ownership and 0 otherwise. Small and
Medium are dummies taking value of 1 if firms have more than 5 but less than 50 workers or more than 50 and less than
5 0 0w o r k e r sr e s p e c t i v e l ya n d0o t h e r w i s e .D ij are a set of dummies indicating the sector of operations of firm i in country
j.hj is a country fixed effect. The dependent variable is truncated at 0 and 1. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is
the sum of credit provided by private commercial banks and development banks.
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Including Development 
Bank Finance
Excluding Foreign Bank 
Finance
In columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is credit provided by domestically owned commercial banks.
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